In recent weeks, US President Donald Trump has reignited his interest in buying Greenland from Denmark. During his previous presidency, Trump proposed purchasing Greenland — a suggestion swiftly rejected by Greenlandic and Danish leaders, who emphasised that the island was not for sale and that its future rests with the Greenlandic people [source]. Now, Trump has doubled down, describing US control of Greenland as an ‘absolute necessity’ and refusing to rule out the use of economic or military measures to achieve this goal [source].
While Copenhagen and Nuuk remain open to closer cooperation with Washington, they have reiterated that Greenland is not for sale [source]. This stance could lead to a range of developments, from expanded security agreements to the potential for American military intervention in a NATO territory that the US has helped defend since a 1951 agreement with Denmark [source]. These tensions have also reignited discussions about Greenlandic independence ahead of its national elections in April 2025 [source].
This blog explores how recent geopolitical developments are likely to impact the cyber threat landscape in Greenland, highlighting the growing strategic significance of the Arctic region in international security.
As sea ice recedes, geopolitical competition over Arctic resources, territories, and transport routes has intensified. Countries are racing to exploit newly accessible waterways, extract valuable resources, and capitalise on emerging industrial and transportation opportunities. Among the most prominent actors in this landscape are Russia and China, both asserting themselves as key players in the region.
Russia, a dominant Arctic state, has pursued an assertive Arctic policy since its 2014 annexation of Crimea [source]. Under its ‘Arctic 2035’ strategy, the Kremlin has modernised its military infrastructure, established bases, and conducted large-scale exercises to secure its regional interests and assert influence [source]. Similarly, China has declared itself a ‘near-Arctic state’ in its 2018 Arctic Strategy [source]. By integrating the ‘Polar Silk Road’ into the ‘New Silk Road’ (the Belt and Road Initiative), China has signalled interest in the region’s economic prospects, particularly resource wealth and maritime routes, with projects like Kvanefjeld and Isua being central to Beijing’s resource acquisition strategy and global influence expansion [source].
Both Russia and China are assessed to have significant intent to exploit the ongoing political uncertainty surrounding Greenland to advance their regional objectives. The following sections explore how such exploitation is likely to manifest in the cyber domain.
Cyber-enabled espionage by Russia and China presents a significant threat to the Arctic region [source]. Russia, in particular, is assessed as having the greatest intent, capability, and proximity to target Arctic states. This is exacerbated by its continued isolation from the international community, which has increased its reliance on intelligence to support regime decision-making. Russian intelligence activities are likely to focus on Greenland's foreign, security, and defence policies, primarily targeting Danish government entities, as these policy areas remain under Danish jurisdiction [source]. However, certain Greenlandic government officials, particularly those involved in foreign affairs, domestic affairs, and infrastructure, are also likely to be targeted. If Greenland strengthens defence agreements with the US, Russian intelligence efforts are almost certain to intensify, targeting developments such as the establishment of bases, personnel deployments, and strategic initiatives. There is also a realistic possibility that North Korea may engage in similar intelligence collection activities, as upgrades to facilities like the US’s Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base) could have implications for Pyongyang's advancing nuclear capabilities [source].
Trade and energy policies also represent key areas of interest for both Russia and China. Espionage efforts are particularly likely to target information about Greenland’s substantial natural resources, including its largely untapped reserves of iron, zinc, uranium, and rare earth elements (REEs), which are of significant strategic value to both states [source]. For China in particular, restricting US access to Greenlandic and Danish REEs would help maintain its leverage in ongoing trade disputes, where control over REE exports has been a critical bargaining tool [source].
Both China and Russia have previously conducted hybrid operations targeting Arctic states [source]. Given Greenland's less developed infrastructure compared to the US and Denmark, it is highly likely that both countries possess the capability to target the island [source]. To achieve their intelligence objectives, Russia and China are likely to engage in pre-positioning activities within Greenland's IT networks, as recently demonstrated by Chinese threat actors, which have achieved long-term access to US telecommunication systems [source]. This raises significant concerns not only about intelligence collection but also about the potential for lateral movement into operational technology (OT) systems, which underpin critical national infrastructure (CNI) such as telecommunications, defence, healthcare, and transportation (see below).
With Greenland’s municipal council elections scheduled for 01 April 2025 and parliamentary (Inatsisartut) elections required by 06 April 2025, the potential for electoral interference is significant [source]. As in Denmark, voting in Greenland is conducted using paper ballots, which are linked to voters' personal identification numbers (CPR numbers) [source]. Successful election fraud is therefore assessed as unlikely. Instead, interference is more likely to manifest as voter manipulation through disinformation campaigns aimed at influencing public opinion.
Such efforts could be directed at steering voters toward pro-independence candidates or encouraging a ‘for’ vote in a potential independence referendum. Support for pro-independence candidates could weaken Greenland’s ties with Denmark and the US, potentially closer aligning the island with Russia and China. These states may present themselves as partners capable of supporting economic development and improving the welfare of Greenlandic citizens, a key priority for the Greenlandic government [source].
The independence movement has already gained momentum since Trump's comments. No timeline for a referendum has been set; however, there is a realistic possibility that one could occur in the short to medium term [source]. If successful, it would initiate a lengthy transition period during which Greenland would be vulnerable to adversarial influence in both physical and cyber domains
Disinformation campaigns are likely to focus on the ‘inherently fraught relationship’ between Denmark and its self-governing territories, exploiting historical grievances, such as the 'Spiral Case' and the 'Little Danes Experiment,' while amplifying recent discussions around racism against Greenlandic people [source][source][source][source]. Russia and China have previously been linked to activities that exacerbate such tensions, including the 2019 Letter Scandal and efforts to highlight claims that Denmark has deprioritised Greenland to support Ukraine [source][source]. Similar campaigns could aim to foster negative perceptions of the US by portraying its interest in Greenland as neo-imperialist [source]. Comparable efforts have depicted Denmark as a vassal state, lacking the authority to oppose US interests [source].
Russia remains a dominant actor within the influence landscape and is therefore assessed to pose the most significant threat to Greenland in this domain. Drawing on Russian tactics observed in 2024, social media platforms are anticipated to serve as critical vectors for these influence campaigns, particularly as platforms remove fact-checking protections [source]. Tactics are likely to include the use of proxy sites, bot farms, and AI-generated content, such as deepfakes, to amplify messaging and spread disinformation [source].
Additionally, there is a realistic possibility that China may engage in similar activities, although these efforts are likely to focus on promoting narratives that emphasise China as a strong and reliable trade partner. This approach aligns with China’s broader influence operations, which seek to position it as an attractive economic ally for Greenland [source].
Hybrid operations, combining digital narratives with physical activity, are also a realistic possibility. Evidence from 2024 indicates an increased use of these tactics in Europe, particularly by Russia, to amplify divisions and advance strategic goals [source]. In Greenland’s context, such operations could realistically target Danish political and cultural institutions, as well as symbols of colonial history, like the Statue of Hans Egede in Nuuk—a frequent focus of protests and vandalism [source]. Additionally, social media could facilitate protests, leveraging existing movements to incite physical actions, as seen during the UK Southport Protests in mid-2024 [source].
However, a lack of local proxies in Greenland, compared to countries like Germany and France, may constrain Russia's ability to execute such operations on the ground [source]. Instead, hybrid operations may target Greenland-related institutions and individuals in Denmark, further intensifying an anti-Denmark sentiment.
Although disruptive cyber activity is considered a low-level threat to Greenland, it remains a realistic possibility [source]. This was evidenced by two incidents in 2022, when the Greenlandic government’s network was taken offline and when an attack on the healthcare system significantly limited health services [source].
While disruptions may occur for various reasons, Greenland's growing strategic importance, particularly in Arctic security, increases the risk of attacks on telecommunications systems, satellite networks, and defence facilities. These attacks would likely target intelligence and defence capabilities, such as missile warning systems, space surveillance, and space control sensors. For this purpose, techniques such as GPS spoofing and jamming, which Russia has used extensively in its ongoing war against Ukraine, could be employed [source]. Other potential activities include distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, though current threats targeting public-facing websites have had limited impact [source].
Greenland's vulnerability to disruptive cyber activity is also heightened by its limited telecommunications infrastructure. By law, Tusass (formerly Tele-Post) is the sole provider of telecommunications and Internet services [source]. Additionally, the island relies on a single data centre and two subsea cables, Greenland Connect and Greenland Connect North, which connect Greenland to the global network via Canada and Iceland [source][source].
The concentration of critical infrastructure in Greenland creates a single point of failure, rendering it an appealing target for espionage, pre-positioning activities, and disruption. Any such disruption is likely to have widespread consequences across multiple CNI sectors and could have widespread consequences given the absence of alternative connectivity options, which similarly increased the impact of cable disruptions in the Faroe and Shetland Islands in 2022 [source]. Recent suspected Russian sabotage of subsea cables in the Nordics also highlights the realistic threat of physical disruption targeting these providers [source]. The continued presence of Russian and Chinese vessels in the region significantly increases the risk of intentional or accidental disruptions to Greenland’s infrastructure.
The evolving cyber threat landscape in the Arctic is closely tied to ongoing geopolitical shifts. Russia and China are most likely to benefit from exploiting political uncertainties in Greenland through cyber-enabled means, including espionage and physical and social disruption. As US cyber policy is anticipated to shift in the short to medium term toward more offensive operations under Trump’s ‘peace through strength’ foreign policy agenda, US cyber activity targeting the Arctic region should be considered [source]. However, any US activity targeting Greenland and/or Denmark is assessed to be highly unlikely—the likelihood would only increase if relations between Denmark and the US were to deteriorate. This scenario is deemed unlikely in the immediate term. As a result, Russia and China remain the primary cyber threats to Greenland.
While this blog primarily focuses on Greenland, these conclusions are likely to be relevant throughout the region. Any such cyber activity could have far-reaching impacts on global supply chains, especially as the Arctic assumes greater strategic importance for international trade, defence, and technological advancements, including the establishment of new data centres [source]. Consequently, there is an urgent need to implement solutions that secure the region for countries and organisations with vested interests, minimising risks to supply chain stability and data security.
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